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its fundamental assumptions and final theses may be rejected, is a philosophic work whose importance it is impossible to exaggerate. As a criticism of science it is an extremely significant contribution to the field of methodology and as an exposition of pragmatism,—though the author repudiates the title and scornfully identifies American pragmatism with mere utilitarianism,—it is the only coherent and systematic expression of this “new name for some old ways of thinking.”

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JOURNALS AND NEW BOOKS

MIND. July, 1912. *On Relations; and in Particular the Cognitive Relation* (pp. 305–328): S. ALEXANDER. — As to relations in general, all are as substantive as their terms. As to internality and externality, neither alternative is strictly true. Knowing is the togetherness of a mind and its object. This relation of togetherness is extremely elementary and simple. It is experienced in “my enjoyment of the perceiving.” *Notes on the Problem of Time* (pp. 329–346): J. S. MACKENZIE. — A summing up of the main results of recent discussions of the problems of time. The results are stated in connection with, and chiefly in contrast to, Kant’s treatment of the subject. *The Analysis of ΕΠΙΣΤΗΜΗ in Plato’s Seventh Epistle* (pp. 347–370): A. E. TAYLOR. — Deals with the genuineness of a disputed passage (342a, 344d) in Plato’s seventh *Epistle*. Argues that “the whole section has a definite purpose, that its leading contentions are in principle sound.” Answers the charge of digression by maintaining the relevancy and connection of the passage and the charge of unintelligibility by translating and interpreting the passage. *The Ethical System of Richard Cumberland and its Place in the History of British Ethics* (pp. 371–398): FRANK CHAPMAN SHARP. — It is maintained that the ethical system of Cumberland is “one of the three or four most powerful influences in the history of British ethics.” An account of the system is given. The eighteenth-century British moralists were profoundly influenced by Clarke and Shaftesbury, and these in turn, it is held, based their moral systems upon the writings of Cumberland to an extent hitherto scarcely suspected. *Discussions: The Nature of Sense-Data* (pp. 399–409): G. DAWES HICKS. — An examination of Mr. Bertrand Russell’s view of sense-apprehension as set forth in his *The Problems of Philosophy*. *Euler’s Circles and Adjacent Space* (pp. 410–415): L. E. HICKS. — Points out the difficulties of diagrammatic methods in Logic. *Critical Notes*: B. Bosanquet, *The Principle of Individuality and Value: the Gifford Lectures (Edinburgh) for 1911*: J. E. McTAGGART. J. Ward, *The Realm of Ends, or Pluralism and Theism: the Gifford Lectures (St. Andrews) delivered 1907–1910*: A. E. TAYLOR. A. E. Taylor, *Varia Socratica*, First Series: H. W. BLUNT. W. Wells Denton, *John Wesley Young: Lectures on Fundamental Concepts of Algebra and*

Geometry: P. E. B. JOURDAIN. *New Books. Philosophical Periodicals. Notes.*

Calkins, Mary W. *Persistent Problems of Philosophy*. Third revised edition. New York: The Macmillan Company. 1912. Pp. xvi + 577. \$2.50.

Calkins, Mary W. *A First Book in Psychology*. Third Revised Edition. New York: The Macmillan Company. 1912. Pp. xix + 426. \$1.90.

Martin, Ernest G. *The Measurement of Induction Shocks*. New York: John Wiley and Sons. 1912. Pp. vii + 117. \$1.25.

Martin, Lillien J. *Die Projektionsmethode und die Lokalisation visueller und anderer Vorstellungsbilder*. Leipzig: Verlag von Johann A. Barth. 1912. Pp. 231. M. 6.

Moore, G. E. *Ethics*. New York: Henry Holt and Company. 1912. Pp. v + 256. \$0.50.

NOTES AND NEWS

LETTER FROM PROFESSOR LOVEJOY

TO THE EDITORS OF THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY, PSYCHOLOGY, AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS:

In a review in a recent number of this JOURNAL reference was made by me to "the imposture in the pseudo-voluntarism of the neo-Fichteans." It appears that some readers have understood this phrase (a) to refer to absolute idealists in general; (b) to impute to those to whom it referred some sort of conscious and deliberate deceit. The former interpretation is, I believe, expressly excluded by the language of the paragraph in which the phrase occurred; the reference was plainly to a more limited school. But in any case, the word "imposture," since it doubtless may convey the implication mentioned, should, I think, be withdrawn,—not only as "unparliamentary," but also as ill-chosen to convey the criticism intended. My purpose—since I am not a neo-realist, and therefore am not so well acquainted with other men's minds as with my own—was not to dogmatize concerning the intentions, still less to judge of the motives, but to call attention to the actual result of the manner of expression employed by certain philosophers. The inevitableness of that result does, indeed, appear to me so clear that I find it surprising that it should not be clear to those who use the sort of language which is in question. But I have no ground for asserting that it is so, or for denying that the writers themselves were the first to be imposed upon by their own rhetoric. And even if that result has been in some degree foreseen by some of the writers criticized, their use of such modes of expression may well be, and doubtless is, due to highly honorable and amiable motives: to an irenic spirit which desires to maximize agreement with the prevailing beliefs of mankind; to a temperamental sympathy with those beliefs; or to a wish to put philosophy into terms that make for religious consolation or moral edification. These motives have, I surmise, greatly influenced